Unpopular government in the United States — Story, Setting & Ideas

(0 User reviews) 745

In Category - Political Thought

Authors: Kales, Albert Martin, 1875-1922 Digital Source: Project Gutenberg Gutenberg Release Year: 2022 First Publication Year: Not confirmed

Key Word: United States -- Politics and government Target Reader: Readers of public-domain and historical texts

Book Edition: Project Gutenberg digital edition Book Language: en

Edition facts

Words 50,410

Reading time 220 min

Text sections 28

Before opening Unpopular government in the United States — Story, Setting & Ideas, the edition data offers a quick orientation: 50,410 words, 3 hr 40 min estimated reading time, and 28 detected text sections.

The text analysis averages about 25.7 words per sentence, while the detected sections provide another way to judge how the source is divided.

Project Gutenberg metadata also associates the work with “United States -- Politics and government,” connecting these edition facts with the source record’s subject description.

Source: Project Gutenberg record #68928

Albert M. Kales, a Northwestern law professor, dissects how U.S. government became 'unpopular'—controlled by extra-legal political machines—despite democratic safeguards. Drawing on legal analysis and electoral mechanics, he examines voter ignorance, the inverted pyramid of districts, and reforms like the commission form, offering a concrete diagnosis of early 20th-century governance failures.

Editorial Edition Score 4.8/5

★★★★★ ★★★★★

Calculated from edition completeness, EPUB availability, text structure and catalogue metadata. Not a user rating.

How this score is calculated

Description quality20 pts
Title & short description10 pts
Source metadata20 pts
Text length15 pts
Chapters / structure15 pts
EPUB file integrity20 pts

Total of 100 points, scaled to a 2.5-5.0 range. Editions with an empty description or a missing EPUB file are not scored.

Edition quality

File: pg68928

Read the Text

ability to direct about one-tenth of the voters in a county or city election how to cast their ballots. But this was possible only when the newspaper concentrated its entire influence on the filling of one or two offices. The newspaper gives very little advice to the voter with respect to the filling of a considerable majority of offices for which elections are held. Even as to the few offices with regard to the candidates for which the newspaper makes a great effort to advise voters, its influence is limited. A large proportion of the electorate vote the party circle. Some are moved by sentiment or strong prejudices; others by the fact that men of whom they know something personally are responsible for the nominations or appear as candidates in a prominent place on a particular ticket. In every case a vote in the party circle, which is a blanket vote for a great number of party candidates of whom the voter has no knowledge, is a vote according to the direction of those who promoted or directed the nomination of the men who appear as candidates in that party column. It is believed, however, that a very large body of voters--especially in districts where large numbers are generally ignorant or illiterate--need, and indeed must have, advice as to how to vote from some individual whom they either look up to and trust, or fear. These voters do not ask for political leadership. They do not desire information upon which to found political opinions. All they ask for is advice as to how to mark their ballots. In congested centers of population this advice is sought within a few hours in a single day by tens and even hundreds of thousands of voters. The voter wants information as he approaches the booth. Even those who allow a newspaper to direct them how to vote need advice in voting for offices which the newspaper ignores. So the practice of independent voting and splitting tickets causes the voter to seek advice from those who make it their business to know something about the candidates. If these masses do not obtain instruction and advice as to whom to vote for they must refrain from voting, or pitch a coin, or fall back upon the party circle. They do the last as the most rational, and thus take the directions of those who are able to place the names of candidates under the party circle. In brief, the entire situation is something like this: As to four-fifths of the candidates for office the voters are politically ignorant; yet they insist upon voting and in taking seriously their duty as a citizen to vote. They will not pitch a coin. Hence they must vote the way they are told. Nine-tenths of the voters who cast ballots for four-fifths of the offices are directed to vote by those who have placed the names upon the ballot or by someone who makes a special appeal to the voter at the polls or by a special canvass before election.

Not only, however, does the political ignorance of the voter present an obvious opportunity to someone to direct him how to vote and thus cast his ballot for him, but an overwhelming self-interest on the part of individuals invokes at once the strongest motive to use the opportunity. The man that can control the power of the electorate will secure the power to appoint to office. He who can regularly place the candidate in office will soon control the holder of the office and exercise the governmental power which the officeholder wields. The securing of such governmental power has always been an object in itself to a proportion of the individuals in every community. When seen as a source of personal profit and advancement, the numbers who will strive for it and the efforts which they will make are greatly increased. Indeed, the prize which the successful secure is such as to produce the keenest competition and the most exhaustive effort.

Continue Reading →

Albert M. Kales opens Unpopular Government in the United States with a striking claim: the very precautions meant to prevent unpopular government—frequent elections, separation of powers, federalism—have, in practice, enabled its rise. Writing in 1914 as a Northwestern University law professor, Kales builds his argument not on abstract theory but on a detailed examination of electoral mechanics. He introduces the term "politocrats" to describe the extra-legal government that emerges when voters become politically ignorant due to the sheer burden of elections.

The book’s core insight is that the "inverted pyramid" of overlapping governmental and electoral districts—where a single voter may cast ballots for dozens of offices across multiple jurisdictions—creates an electorate too overwhelmed to make informed choices. This ignorance, Kales argues, is not accidental but structural, and it systematically transfers power from voters to those who can organize and direct the vote.

The Inverted Pyramid and Voter Disfranchisement

Kales grounds his diagnosis in a concrete example: a map showing the election districts in which a voter from Winnetka, Illinois, must vote. This map, included in the book, illustrates what Kales calls the "inverted pyramid"—a system where a single citizen is simultaneously part of a precinct, ward, city, township, county, state, and federal district, each with its own set of elective offices. The result is a ballot so long and complex that the average voter cannot possibly know all the candidates or issues.

Kales argues that this burden effectively disfranchises the electorate. The voter, overwhelmed by the number of choices and the lack of accessible information, becomes politically ignorant. This ignorance is not a personal failing but a systemic outcome. The voter’s power then passes to those who can exploit this ignorance—the "politocrats"—who direct the vote through organization, money, and influence. Kales emphasizes that this transfer of power is not illegal but extra-legal, forming a real but unofficial government that operates alongside the official one.

The Machinery of Politocracy

Having identified the problem, Kales dissects how the extra-legal government maintains itself. In a series of tightly argued sections, he shows that the politocrats use their power selfishly, both to perpetuate their own control and to benefit the interests that support them. They can withstand popular disapproval because the same structural ignorance that created them also shields them from accountability.

Kales catalogs the tools of this machine: the party circle and party column on ballots, which encourage straight-ticket voting; the primary system, which can be captured by insiders; and the sheer expense of running for office in large districts, which limits candidates to those with money or backing. He notes that even well-intentioned reforms, such as the Australian ballot and civil-service acts, have been insufficient to break the politocrats' grip. The book’s tone is analytical rather than polemical, but its evidence is damning: the system is rigged not by conspiracy but by design.

Reforms and Their Limits

In the second half of the work, Kales evaluates proposed remedies. He examines the initiative, referendum, and recall, as well as independent movements and new parties. His assessment is cautious: these tools can help, but they are not panaceas. The most promising reform, he suggests, is the commission form of government for smaller cities, but only if it is accompanied by a concentration of governmental power and the election of commissioners from small, "wieldy" districts where candidates can be known personally.

Kales is particularly skeptical of electing commissioners at large from large districts. He argues that this method does not produce the "best men" but instead forces candidates to rely on money and machine backing. The leading citizens, he observes, are usually unavailable for municipal office. Instead, the system tends to relapse into the same pattern of district-based representation it was meant to replace. Kales also addresses the problem of overlapping special districts—like the Sanitary District of Cook County—and proposes that their commissioners be appointed by the constituent municipal governments rather than elected at large.

Kales’s book is a lawyer’s brief against the structural flaws in American governance, written with precision and a clear eye for how institutions actually function. Readers should approach it as a period piece that illuminates Progressive-era concerns about democracy and efficiency, but also as a work whose analysis of voter ignorance, district design, and extra-legal power remains relevant. The excerpts do not reveal whether Kales’s proposed reforms were ever adopted or proved effective, but his diagnosis of the problem is detailed enough to stand on its own.

I finished Kales’s account of machine politics and felt that odd ache of recognition—how systems drift from their own ideals. It reminded me of sitting with A Short History of English Liberalism — Inside the Classic, watching a similar hope quietly fray. Neither one shouts; they just leave you holding the question a little longer. That stayed with me.