The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis A History with Documents — A Reader’s Guide

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In Category - International Affairs

Authors: Nordlund, Karl, 1871- Digital Source: Project Gutenberg Gutenberg Release Year: 2007 First Publication Year: Not confirmed

Key Word: Sweden - -Politics and government -- 1814-1905; Norway -- Politics and government -- 1814-1905 Target Reader: Readers of public-domain and historical texts

Book Edition: Project Gutenberg digital edition Book Language: en

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Words 42,876

Reading time 187 min

Text sections 6

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Source: Project Gutenberg record #21253

A 1905 Swedish academic's account of the union crisis, pairing a narrative of events with primary documents, revealing a partisan stance that frames Norwegian actions as revolutionary while defending Swedish and royal prerogatives.

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[Sidenote: _Norway's attitude to the same._]

By the amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Prime Minister was also in the Ministerial Council (for Foreign affairs), so that the Council instead of having only two members, ever after had three, the object being to guarantee that the Cabinet Council should be more fully represented in they the in administration of Foreign affairs. Now, as previously mentioned, by a Royal Decree in 1835 the Norwegian Prime Minister at Stockholm was admitted into the Ministerial Council when foreign affairs affecting the two Kingdoms were negotiated. Thus Norway by the proposed Constitutional amendment was supposed to occupy a somewhat more unfavourable position than formerly. But Sweden immediately offers a more extended representation in the Council for Foreign affairs, which offer, however, is, for some inexplicable reason, refused by Norway on formal grounds. In the year 1891 this offer was renewed, but then the majority on the Left Side of the Storthing finds a very excellent reason for refusing the proposition, by pointing out, that the Swedish Council in motioning towards the proposed amendment in the Act of Union (not in the proposed paragraph itself) maintains the stand-point that Sweden's leadership in the administration of Foreign affairs is founded on legal right[9:1].

But something else is said to have happened in 1885, which was not discovered by the Norwegian side till several years later, and which, being exposed by the Norwegian agitation in these days, offers to we Swedes the delights of novelty. Formerly foreign affairs were supposed to be administered chiefly by the Swedish King personally, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs is said to have stood in a more personal relation to the King. Foreign Affairs under such circumstances were supposed to be more impartially treated, so that even Norway's lawful interests could receive due attention. But by the amendment of the Constitution of 1885 the Swedish Foreign Minister would be entirely subservient to Swedish Parliamentarism, which made the employment of the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the protection of Norwegian interests, still more dissatisfactory for Norway than formerly. This is pretended to have become the source of the last twenty year's Union struggle[9:2]. Now the state of the case is this, _the Foreign Minister's parliamentary responsibility has not been increased by the amendment of the Constitution in 1885_. Formerly he was--just as he is now-- responsible, as reporter, in the first place for all _resolutions_ in Foreign affairs. The point that was formally confirmed by law in 1885 was, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should also _prepare_ matters concerning foreign affairs. According to the older version of the paragraph that was altered that year (1885), the King was invested with greater rights in reference to that side of the administration of foreign affairs. Thus the amendment of the Constitution in 1885 only effected that the actual influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sweden's foreign policy was brought into harmony with the formal responsibility he held in all cases for Sweden's Foreign policy. It may be added that this constitutional amendment only confirmed the old practice, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs was formerly regularly employed to prepare matters concerning foreign affairs, and that his previous employment in the preparation of foreign affairs was naturally carried out under observation of the responsibility in which he stood for the resolutions taken, and was not inspired by any mysterious personal relations to the King. The whole of this Norwegian notion of the fatal influence on the Union in this constitutional amendment, is, in fact, nothing but a manufactured theory containing no real grounds whatsoever.

Now it must be observed that Norway had formerly no regular parliamentary control over foreign affairs, _but the Swedish offer of 1891 was just intended to give the Norwegian Storthing the right to this control, to be exercised under the same conditions as those in the Swedish Diet_. But the Storthing refused (as previously mentioned) the Swedish offer; it preferred to keep the quarrel alive, and in order to do this, it was necessary to be able to refer to Swedish oppression.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian radicals' method of taking matters into their hands._]

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Karl Nordlund’s 1905 work presents itself as a history with supporting documents, but the excerpts reveal a text deeply engaged in contemporary political argument. The author’s introductory remarks state his aim to counter statements in Fridtjof Nansen’s brochure, and he warns that his representation may have “caught the tone of present feeling in Sweden.” The book is thus not a neutral chronicle but a polemical intervention, structured to defend Swedish constitutional positions and the Union King’s prerogatives against Norwegian claims of legality.

A Document Collection with a Thesis

The book’s bipartite structure—a historical narrative followed by a section of “Acts”—is itself a rhetorical choice. The documents, drawn from Norway’s Grundlov, the Riksakten (Union laws), and official proposals and memoranda, are presented as evidence for the author’s interpretation. Yet the selection is explicitly limited: Nordlund notes that in the consular negotiations only “the discussions on the most disputed points are given.” The reader is thus given a curated archive, one that supports the Swedish government’s case. The inclusion of the so-called Communiqué (the preparatory agreement between Swedish and Norwegian cabinet councils) and extracts from Swedish and Norwegian proposals frames the breakdown of negotiations as a Norwegian refusal to accept reasonable terms.

The Language of Legality and Revolution

Nordlund’s narrative repeatedly contrasts Norwegian claims of legality with what he calls “revolution.” He writes that the Storthing’s resolutions are “not called revolutionary in Norway” but are “on the contrary, perfectly legal”—a sarcastic formulation that underscores his disagreement. He accuses Norwegian logic of going “boldly further” after deposing the King, and he insists that the dissolution of the Union violated constitutional prescriptions. The author’s own vocabulary is charged: he refers to “Norwegian agitation,” “infamous accusations,” and a “revolutionary Storthing.” These terms are not neutral description but part of a concerted effort to delegitimize the Norwegian position. The reader should note that the excerpts do not include the Norwegian documents that might present the opposing legal reasoning.

The King’s Prerogative as a Central Theme

A recurring argument in the excerpts is that the King, as Union King, had the right to veto the consular law even against the Norwegian cabinet’s opinion. Nordlund emphasizes that the King acted “in the capacity of the chief representative of the Union” and that his prerogative was “the King’s prerogative alone.” The author’s defense of royal authority is explicit: he reproduces King Oscar’s protest address and praises its “clear and convincing terms.” The book thus treats the crisis not merely as a diplomatic dispute but as a constitutional conflict over the locus of sovereignty. The excerpts do not, however, provide the Norwegian cabinet’s legal arguments for why the King’s veto was invalid, leaving the reader with only one side of that constitutional debate.

Readers should approach this text as a primary source for understanding Swedish nationalist and royalist perspectives in 1905, rather than as an impartial history. The documents in the second half are best read alongside the Norwegian sources they were meant to refute. Nordlund’s work is valuable precisely for its partisan clarity: it shows how one side constructed its case, what evidence it chose, and what language it used to frame the conflict as a defense of law against revolution.

There’s something touching about a partisan history, how it guards its own brittle certainties. Reading this 1905 account, I kept thinking of how nations, like people, rewrite their pasts to survive. That quiet ache lingers in the margins of The Rebirth of Turkey — Reading Notes, where another old world is learning to fade into something unfamiliar.