Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated? — Background and Themes

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Reinsch, Paul S. (Paul Samuel), 1869-1923 Project Gutenberg 2021 Not confirmed
Europe -- Politics and government; Diplomacy Readers of public-domain and historical texts
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Words 49,710
Reading time 217 min
Text sections 22

This digital edition of Secret Diplomacy: How Far Can It Be Eliminated? — Background and Themes is described by source-level measurements including 49,710 words, 3 hr 37 min estimated reading time, and 22 detected text sections.

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An analysis of secret diplomacy's persistence in modern statecraft, examining historical cases from the 18th century through World War I, with emphasis on the tension between democratic accountability and the tradition of confidential negotiations.
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CHAPTER I. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 22

II. OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 36

III. AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 45

IV. NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 58

V. TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY AND MOROCCO 70

VI. ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 84

VII. THE CRISIS OF 1914 102

VIII. THE SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 116

IX. HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT DEFERRED 129

X. THE DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 136

XI. PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 149

XII. THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 166

XIII. A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 181

XIV. RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 194

Is secret diplomacy the evil spirit of modern politics? Is it the force that keeps nations in a state of potential hostility and does not allow a feeling of confidence and of wholehearted coöperation to grow up? Or is it only a trade device, a clever method of surrounding with an aura of importance the doings of the diplomats, a race of men of average wisdom and intelligence who traditionally have valued the prestige of dealing with “secret affairs of state”? Or is it something less romantic than either of these--merely the survival from a more barbarous age of instincts of secretiveness and chicane acquired at a time when self-defense was the necessity of every hour?

It is quite patent that the practice of secret diplomacy is incompatible with the democratic theory of state. Even in the Liberal theory of state it finds little favor, although that is disposed to grant a great deal of discretion to the representatives who are given the trusteeship of public affairs. Yet the essential idea of Liberalism, government by discussion, includes foreign affairs within its scope fully as much as those of purely domestic concern. In applying to public affairs the experience of private business it is often argued that as the directorate of a corporation could not be expected to transact its business in public, even so diplomatic conversations are not to be heralded from the house tops. How far this particular analogy between private business and public affairs will hold, is a point we shall have to examine later. At first sight the planning of private enterprises and the consideration of benefits and losses, can hardly furnish completely satisfactory rules for the conduct of public affairs, particularly those involving the life and death of the persons concerned. Stockholders would be reluctant to allow such matters to be determined by a board of trustees in secret conclave.

Divesting ourselves of all prejudices, even of righteous indignation against plainly unconscionable practices, we shall try to examine and analyze the action of great diplomats and to see to what extent really important results achieved by them have depended upon the use of secret methods. In the 18th Century, diplomacy was still looked upon as a sharp game in which wits were matched, with a complete license as to the means pursued; provided, however, that embarrassing discovery must be avoided, in other words, that the exact method of deception must be so closely guarded that only the results will show. The great diplomats of the beginning of the 19th century--Metternich, Talleyrand, Pozzo di Borgo--while they talked much about humanitarian principles, continued to play a barren game of intrigue. Napoleon III, that master of devious statecraft, will always be cited by excoriators of secret diplomacy as an abhorrent example--a man undone by the results of his own plotting. Bismarck indeed prided himself on looking down upon petty secret manœuvering and cast a certain amount of contempt on the whole diplomatic business; he often disconcerted his opponents by an unaccustomed frankness. Yet the orientation of his statesmanship was based upon the idea of helping history to find a short-cut to her aims through masterful plotting. He took the reins out of the hands of Providence.

Paul S. Reinsch opens his inquiry with three sharply contrasting possibilities: secret diplomacy as an evil spirit, a mere trade device, or a survival from a barbarous age. The phrasing is deliberately provocative, setting up a forensic tone that persists throughout the work. Reinsch, a former diplomat and political scientist, draws on his own experience to dissect the mechanics of confidential statecraft. The book is structured as a historical survey, moving from eighteenth-century practices through the Congress of Vienna, the diplomacy of Napoleon III and Bismarck, to the secret treaties of World War I. Each chapter examines specific episodes where secrecy shaped outcomes, often with damaging consequences for public trust.

The Rhetoric of Suspicion

Reinsch’s prose is marked by a persistent skepticism toward diplomatic motives. In the introduction, he asks whether secret diplomacy is “the evil spirit of modern politics” or merely a method of “surrounding with an aura of importance the doings of the diplomats.” This binary framing recurs throughout, as he weighs institutional inertia against deliberate deception. His vocabulary often carries moral weight: words like “chicane,” “treachery,” and “cold-shouldering” appear in case studies, reinforcing a judgmental stance. The description of Japan’s twenty-one demands as “startling facts of modern history” exemplifies his tendency to punctuate narrative with evaluative commentary. Reinsch does not feign neutrality; he writes as an advocate for democratic transparency, and his diction consistently aligns with that position.

The Weight of Historical Precedent

The book’s structure is chronological, but Reinsch uses history not as a neutral record but as a series of cautionary tales. Each chapter isolates a diplomatic episode—the Congress of Vienna, Bismarck’s alliances, the Moroccan crises—and subjects it to critical scrutiny. His method is to present the official narrative, then undercut it with evidence of concealed motives or double-dealing. For instance, he quotes Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin’s letter to Count Tisza, in which Czernin advises against “trifling with treachery” unless fully carried out. Such primary sources are deployed to expose the gap between public statements and private calculations. Reinsch’s selection of examples consistently favors episodes where secrecy led to miscalculation or public disillusionment, reinforcing his thesis that confidential diplomacy breeds distrust.

The Language of Exposure

Reinsch’s narrative voice is that of an insider revealing hidden truths. He frequently uses verbs of disclosure: “leak out,” “revealed,” “became quite well known.” In discussing the Japanese demands on China, he notes that despite “assiduously kept secret” negotiations, “the nature of the transaction in general and in detail became quite well known outside.” This pattern suggests a belief that secrecy is ultimately futile—that important matters cannot be hidden. He also employs dramatic contrasts: the “secret council chamber” versus the “vast, peaceful but unmilitant nation.” Such oppositions heighten the moral stakes. Reinsch’s own diplomatic background lends authority to these exposures; he writes as someone who has seen the machinery from within and is now pulling back the curtain.

The Democratic Imperative

Throughout the work, Reinsch anchors his critique in democratic theory. He states bluntly that “the practice of secret diplomacy is incompatible with the democratic theory of state.” This is not a passing remark but a recurring argument. He contrasts the “Liberal theory of state,” which allows discretion to representatives, with the more demanding democratic ideal that requires public discussion of foreign affairs. The book’s title itself—How Far Can It Be Eliminated?—frames the issue as one of degree, not absolutes. Reinsch does not call for total transparency; he acknowledges that some confidentiality may be necessary. But his evidence consistently points to the dangers of excessive secrecy, particularly when it enables narrow national interests at the expense of broader public good. The closing chapters examine parliamentary oversight and recent American experience, suggesting institutional reforms rather than revolutionary change.

Reinsch’s study is best approached as a work of political argument grounded in historical evidence. Readers should attend to the specific cases he selects and the language he uses to frame them. The book does not offer a complete theory of diplomacy but rather a sustained critique of its secretive practices, informed by the author’s own experience. Those interested in the mechanics of international relations will find a wealth of primary-source quotations and sharp analysis, though the work’s polemical edge is never far from the surface.

Reading about how confidences have always shadowed democracy, I kept thinking of that quiet ache in Secret Diplomacy — the sense that some truths only survive in whispers. It reminded me of sitting with American World Policies — Context and Discussion, where that same tension lingers, less argued than felt, like recognizing an old friend’s silence.

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